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Justice rapid response -
VENICE 2006
Full Venice
conference report in pdf format
To view the Venice conference report in html format please select
the links below
Background
Opening session
Background to JRR concept, updates and current state of play
Perspectives from
the field on the JRR
Implementation of the jrr feasibility study and its supplement
Standards of expert rosters and basic training of experts
Role and practical aspects of igos/ngos participation in the jrr
implementation process
Chair’s conclusions
and next steps
Annexes
Annex 1: chair’s conclusions
Annex 2: program
Annex 3: draft documents on cooperation and deployment
Annex 4: list of participants
the Venice conference report
The development and
reinforcement of international justice principles and transitional
justice methods since the early 1990s has not been accompanied in
equal measure by practical assistance to States or international
organisations to meet their responsibilities. In post-conflict
situations, there may be political and security windows of
opportunity conducive to the commencement of an accountability
process that is not matched by available expertise or resources.
Moreover, the sooner that information regarding war crimes, crimes
against humanity or genocide during that conflict is identified,
collected and preserved, the more likely it is that such information
will be accurate and adequate for the appropriate accountability
mechanisms. The international community is not now equipped to move
quickly when such windows of opportunity appear. Thus crucial
evidence may be lost and opportunities missed to have justice play a
positive role in securing lasting peace in the post-conflict
society. The JRR mechanism aims to remedy this deficiency in the
context of a wide range of investigative assistance to States and
international institutions.
JRR is intended to be an
international cooperative mechanism for the supply of voluntary
assistance at the request of a State or international institution,
where the identification, collection and preservation of information
would assist at any stage a wide range of international and
transitional justice options. The specific functions most likely to
be carried out by the JRR mechanism in this respect are, inter alia:
pattern of violence investigation; forensic mapping; documentary
evidence investigation; visual image collection; identification of
potential witnesses; and identification of massacre sites. JRR was
identified as providing an improvement on the status quo by being a
cooperative mechanism that does not need to be created anew each
time there is a request for assistance. In this way, it can
significantly reduce response times in providing assistance that is
both impartial and which meets international standards; it shares
the burden of assistance through coordination of the resources of
States, international organisations and civil society; and, as a
global effort, provides capacity-building by involving all States in
the mechanism, irrespective of resources.
Four meetings had taken
place prior to June 2006 to help define and launch the JRR concept:
New York (April 2004); The Hague (June 2004); and New York (December
2004 and December 2005) involving representatives of governments,
civil society and international justice institutions. An independent
JRR Feasibility Study was developed, with the support of the
Governments of Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom and preparations were begun to fine-tune
various aspects of the process, including logistical and practical
issues and preparation of the political decision-making process with
regard to the first request(s).
Recognising the potential
relevance of JRR to the enhancement of transitional justice,
No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) offered to host the fifth meeting,
the “Justice Rapid Response Conference”, on 15-17 June 2006 in
Venice at the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and
Democratisation (EIUC), with the financial support of the European
Union and the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany,
Ireland and the United Kingdom. The JRR Conference was attended by
more than 50 participants from 20 countries, representing States,
international organisations, international justice institutions and
civil society.
The Conference was
intended to serve several purposes. As envisaged during the
15 December 2005 meeting in New York, it was foreseen as the next
stage of the international consultative process to develop a
functioning JRR capability. In addition, the Venice Conference was
intended to provide an opportunity to widen the scope of
international actors (states, international courts, international
organisations and non-governmental organisations) that may wish to
participate in JRR, especially those with direct experience with
conflict, post conflict situations and accountability processes.
Therefore, the Conference engaged more State and non-State actors
from African, Latin American and Asian countries, particularly those
who had not yet had the opportunity to participate fully in the
development of the JRR concept.
During the opening
session, welcome remarks were made by representatives of the
organisers; the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights
and Democratisation; and the Republic of Italy. It was agreed that
the meeting be convened as a Conference rather than as a Seminar and
that the representative of Sierra Leone would be the Chair for the
entire Conference. The purposes of the Conference were recalled,
noting that this Conference is intended to give practical
significance to the concept of the JRR and that the voices and views
of those with experience in conflict and post-conflict
accountability efforts are essential to framing and shaping any
eventual deployment within a JRR framework.
In presenting the history
of the JRR concept, it was noted that there have been many
developments in international justice over recent years: there is
now a strong international legal regime that reinforces the primary
responsibility of States in relation to the investigation and
prosecution of serious crimes under international law. What has not
been done is to put practical means in people’s hands to assist them
in enforcing international legal developments. The JRR tries to fill
one of those gaps in supplying tools to see that justice is done and
to ensure that a country does not slip backwards but instead moves
forward to peace. The JRR can help capture available information
before it disappears: while some of the information does not need to
be gathered immediately, if some is not gathered and stored it will
be lost. There is a need to develop guidelines on how to deal with
all of this to ensure that justice helps the peace process, as it is
realised that current efforts are not sufficient.
The meeting on the JRR on
15 December 2005 was very encouraging, as the consensus at that
meeting was that the JRR would be a useful tool, a consensus
reflected during this conference. There have been several
developments since then that now need to be translated into the
first practical steps: (1) There is an update of the feasibility
study to reflect key developments since the feasibility study was
drafted; (2) There are members of the international community
working on these issues that would be interested in using the JRR
and there needs to be someone able to serve as a coordinating body;
and (3) There is a request from the SRSG of MONUC (the UN Mission in
Congo) for JRR assistance in a particular situation.
The JRR is not supposed
to be a new organisation; rather, it is a coordination mechanism to
facilitate the provision of assistance in a timely and coordinated
way, particularly for the collection of information that may
otherwise be lost. It is designed to respond to requests from
States or international organisations that need help or lack
resources but that are willing to address accountability for crimes
under international law. It is not only relevant for post-conflict
countries, but also for countries in conflict, especially those
nearing resolution, as there is a gap in the establishment of
accountability mechanisms that could be filled by the JRR process.
The discussion during the
opening session focused on several general issues relating to the
JRR mechanism, including its scope and potential, with participants
raising the following issues:
-
·The
need for a
communications strategy
to ensure that people beyond those familiar with the JRR process
could learn about the mechanism and to dispel the perception that
many felt was likely to arise of the JRR being closely linked with
or even being part of the International Criminal Court.
-
·The
need to
define the JRR
vis a vis
other bodies, what
distinguishes it from them and how they will cooperate, for example
with the International Criminal Court.
-
·The
need for a
coordination mechanism
and the legal, organisational and other requirements, noting that
the experiences of peace-keeping operations may be useful,
particularly since they are used to dealing with relations between
member States.
-
·The
need to define
how information will be collected
under a JRR deployment, bearing in mind issues of capacity building
and under what rules; the purposes for which it will be used, such
as for lead information or as evidence; and who retains ownership of
the information, bearing in mind issues such as who requests the
assistance, confidentiality and witness protection.
-
Who
can make a request,
for example whether a non-State actor could do so, and how this may
have an impact on the deployment itself; whether different
mechanisms would be needed, for example a new Status of Mission
Agreement if the requesting body is a State; and whether this has an
impact on what happens to the information.
-
·The
composition of teams,
whether on an individual basis, for example to have teams of mixed
nationalities, or on the basis of State-selection, for example to
have a team of a single nationality, or some combination of the two,
for example through a number of sub-teams.
The
need to
identify clearly different kinds of interventions and a clear scope
for each type of intervention.
While the experiences of
those with experience in conflict and post-conflict accountability
efforts were integrated throughout the Conference on the specific
issues under discussion, this session was designed to provide an
opportunity to hear those voices on the overall concept of the
Justice Rapid Response and on specific issues identified by them as
being important in the field, particularly in the context of the
experiences in their countries.
Participants noted the
real need for a JRR mechanism, as evidenced by the recent request
from MONUC. A recurrent theme throughout this session, which was
explored more fully later in the proceedings, was the need for there
to be good cooperation between State and non-State actors in the
design and deployment of missions under a JRR mechanism, both for
purposes of advocacy and as “service providers”. It was also
underscored by many participants that countries that have been or
could be potential recipient countries may also have experience and
expertise that would be useful in future deployments, not just in
contributing to the design and conceptualisation of such
deployments.
Participants noted that
while there is a major demand for justice in situations of conflict
and its aftermath, justice can be manipulated and that while the JRR
will be independent, there is a need for those deployed under such a
framework to be aware of the social, political and cultural
situations in the countries to which they will be deployed. In this
context, pre-deployment training on those aspects plus good
knowledge of the situation in the country concerned was emphasised
as a pre‑condition to the success of any mission deployed within a
JRR framework. This is particularly important in light of the
recurrent recommendation that the JRR will need to work with local
actors and others involved in the situation both in the design of
any mission as well as in its implementation and coordination among
different actors working on the ground will be essential. “Mixed
teams” of local and foreign personnel has proved to be a positive
experience in various countries to manage expectations; work most
effectively; overcome language, cultural and other barriers; and for
capacity building purposes.
The experiences in a
variety of countries indicate that there is a need to involve local
populations in any transitional justice initiatives, even for those
such as the JRR that are not designed to sustain a long-term
presence. For example, the experience of those countries where
outreach with various sectors of society had been done prior to the
establishment of accountability mechanisms was very positive in
terms of engaging local populations, ensuring their understanding of
what was happening in their country and building support and, hence,
building cooperation, particularly in providing information. Civil
society can contribute to this, for example by ensuring that there
is a pool of people who are knowledgeable about the Rome Statute and
who will collaborate with those who come to collect information. It
was emphasised that all transitional justice mechanisms,
particularly those from the “outside”, have learnt that it is
necessary to explain to people their purpose, scope and function,
also as a means of managing expectations. This will be particularly
important for the JRR, as there may or may not be any accountability
process foreseen at the time of deployment within the framework of a
JRR mechanism.
In addition to the
management of expectations, participants highlighted that the major
concern of experts deployed within a JRR framework needs to be the
safety, security and well-being of people with whom they come in
contact. The protection of victims and witnesses was emphasised as
being particularly important and it was noted that this is also
linked with the question of to whom the information belongs and
where it goes. This will be necessary irrespective of the scope of
any deployment: whether or not experts deployed within a JRR
framework take witness statements or not, people will believe that
they did so; provision needs to be made for that. In addition, a
referral system should be developed in advance to enable those
experts to refer people who are in need of shelter, food or other
similar assistance as well as those who are in need of psycho-social
support; since the JRR is intended to be rapid, it is likely that
those people deployed within a JRR framework will be the first to
come into contact with victims and witnesses and should therefore be
prepared to assist in meeting their needs, even if they are unable
to provide such services themselves. In this context, it was also
noted that psycho-social support, including pre- and post-deployment
debriefings, need to be available for the experts themselves,
whether they believe they need it or not.
There was some discussion
on the scope of the JRR, specifically on whether it should be
limited to taking physical evidence, such as photographs, the
identification of crime scenes, such as mass graves, and gathering
information relating to military structures and chain of command
issues, or whether it should be broader and extend to, for example,
taking witness statements. While different opinions were expressed
on this issue, which was also discussed later in the conference, it
was noted that even if it is not the primary focus of the mission,
the JRR should be prepared to take statements because there is a
likelihood that any experts deployed within a JRR framework will be
approached by people wanting to tell their stories, so the JRR
mission should be prepared for that, as the witnesses may not be
available later. In any case, the JRR will need to ask consent for
where the information is going to go before taking any statement,
whether formal or informal. This saves going back to the witness
later and reduces the risk of witness fatigue and of the witness
giving contradictory statements. While the precise scope of the
mission will likely be determined according to circumstances, each
mission in any case needs a clear mandate because an unclear mandate
will inevitably lead to bad field operations.
In addition, the
following issues were raised during the discussion period:
-
The
question of whether
information gathered as part of a JRR process would
also be made available to the defence,
which it would have to be if information collected is given to a
justice institution.
-
·The
importance of including
gender issues and gender crimes
within the mandate of experts deployed within a JRR framework.
-
·Considerations
related to the
short duration of a mission deployed within the JRR framework
including:
-
·the
purpose of the JRR is not capacity building, but that should remain
an important side effect;
-
although
time is short for training of local actors, the involvement of all
relevant actors working on these issues is necessary to ensure the
success of the initiative; and
-
·guidelines
will need to be developed for transferring work that cannot be
completed, for example due to the extreme size of a country.
·One
possibility is for the JRR to take a “backseat” role, for example to
help give
technical and scientific assistance
and to train people in working on DNA identification, which is of
great importance for victims.
·Security
in-country may be
an issue and would have to be taken into account not only in any
deployment but also in the decision of whether to deploy or not.
·The
utility of developing a
resource or toolkit for activists
on how to gather information would be useful to ensure information
collected by local actors in advance of any deployment could be
received within the JRR framework.
·There
is a need to have
reliable interpreters,
which is important not only for the collection of reliable
information but also for the safety and security of victims and
witnesses.
The JRR Feasibility Study
and its supplement raise a number of practical issues that need to
be discussed and decided in preparation for any deployment within a
JRR framework. These issues were discussed throughout the remainder
of the conference, with the following issues broadly identified at
the commencement of this session:
The
levels of commitment for States
to enter the process will not necessarily be equal: some will commit
less and some will participate only by supplying information and not
the funding or personnel.
In any case, there is a
crucial need for a
model text toolbox
for negotiation between future JRR participants and between the JRR
mechanism and requesting entities and a road map for the near future
steps to be taken, including:
-
·Parties
need to be identified to take the lead on certain components;
-
·The
level of contribution of different States need to be determined;
-
·Logistical
problems need to be addressed;
-
An
assessment report for the feasibility of the mission is required to
address more concrete issues like the financial side, logistical and
political aspects of the missions and accountability issues;
-
Determination
of: surveys; external focal points; required prior experience; the
time period in which this has to be done; criteria for selection of
experts; and the criteria and practical aspects for training of
experts.
Identification of
basic frameworks
for:
-
·the
permanent structure of JRR, to guide how decision-making mechanisms
will work and how work done will be assessed;
-
rules
and agreements determining the responsibilities of participating
states, legal issues and status of mission agreements; and
-
secondary
agreements such as criteria for rosters, training standards and
financial regulations.
Discussion during this
session focused around two main issues: the actors involved with
deployment; and the decision-making mechanism and launching of the
mission. It was generally agreed that the JRR mechanism should take
advantage of the expertise of both State and non-State actors, while
recognising the basic nature of the JRR mechanism as a vehicle for
inter-State cooperation. As such, the concept already foresees the
possibility of organisations other than States being involved
through “associate membership”. It was also noted that a JRR
participant may itself be a requesting State; a participant might
have resources to offer in some fields but lack resources in other
fields. While non‑government JRR participants will have a non-voting
status, they will be responsible and accountable by their actions
and tasks. They would also be involved in the mechanism as much as
possible, albeit not in decision-making on whether and how to deploy
within the JRR framework (see below). Nevertheless, it was
recognised that within this context, non-State actors have their own
mandates and operating procedures so they, like States, will retain
overall independence to decide whether or not to participate either
in the mechanism in general or on specific missions deployed within
the JRR framework.
Given the nature of the
JRR as a cooperation mechanism primarily among States, it was
generally agreed that the final say on deployment remains on the
requesting State and that decision-making is the responsibility of
States participating in the JRR mechanism. It was noted that the
simpler the mechanism is, the easier it will be to operate and to
protect. This was accompanied by discussion of whether the JRR
needs a Secretariat, with some noting the importance of having such
a body to ensure proper coordination and information-sharing and
others noting that it is too early to establish such a body, there
needs to be a modest and flexible approach and, since the JRR is not
an organisation as such, it should not in any case have a formal
“Secretariat”. Thus decision-making on whether to deploy would
depend first on a request, which would be circulated among those
participating in the JRR mechanism, and second on a collective
consideration amongst States participating in the JRR mechanism,
with individual participation in specific missions remaining within
the discretion of each participant. Nevertheless, it was eventually
agreed that one State should take the lead (although this State has
yet to be identified) and that in the interim, a willing body should
be identified to maintain momentum and ensure discussion and
information continue to circulate (see Chair’s Conclusions).
There are a number of
factors that need to be considered in the standards of expert
rosters and basic training of experts. The first set of factors to
focus on is resources, functionality and results. There is then the
need to analyse the capacity and capability of participating States
and establish the domestic prospects. In the end, individuals that
might take part in the missions should be selected on an individual
basis and, to ensure that the response can be rapid, they should be
pre-selected before inclusion on any roster. This will include a
number of tasks: identifying the necessary categories of people
(investigators, legal specialists/experts, logistics and security,
country and thematic experts, psychology experts in mass trauma);
setting an evaluation process for how candidates have performed in
previous tasks; addressing language issues; and categorisation of
crucial, highly desirable and specific qualities of the experts.
There are a number of
challenges involved, including the identification of common
standards for human resources, including geographic and gender
representation; an evaluation by States of their own rosters and
processes; identification of organisations that already have rosters
and resources; and technical solutions for operating the rosters in
practice. Many of these aspects can be addressed during compilation
of the rosters and can also be addressed during selection for
deployment. The importance of maintaining up-to-date rosters was
emphasised, including the need for whoever coordinates the JRR
rosters to maintain regular and individual contact with each person
on the roster.
Additional factors to
consider include codes of conduct, how to link the countries’
partnership and contributions with financial aspects, including how
to mobilise funds quickly; what type of equipment is needed (noting
this can often be expensive); and parity in salaries. Another
question is whether there is a need for any screening or selection
for entry into rosters beyond that done by participating States or
organisations. There needs to be concrete but flexible methodology
developed for all of these things, particularly since the
composition of any team may not be known until a request comes in,
which again raises the question of whether there needs to be a
Secretariat that also handles the rosters.
While it can be assumed
that people on the roster will have a certain level of expertise
already, general training can be useful to ensure that levels of
knowledge – particularly on recent developments – are more or less
equal. Nonetheless, it was noted that since there is a need to
respond quickly to requests, there may not be time for training and
this should be taken into account when selecting a team for
deployment. There are other issues of training that may be mission
specific, including those related to the political, social and
cultural framework of the country to which experts are being
deployed. In particular, it was emphasised that knowledge of the
geography, history, gender issues and culture of the country
concerned is crucial for primary analyses.
There are many roles that
can be played by IGOs/NGOs within the framework of the JRR, some of
which are obvious and some of which may be less obvious.
International NGOs can, for example, help provide a structure for
the systematisation of information collected by experts deployed
within a JRR Framework and for local NGOs working on documentation,
with local NGOs acting as resource providers and international NGOs
acting as structure providers. There are a number of ways in which
inter-governmental organisations can provide support to the JRR
mechanism, including through providing practical support to NGOs
working on JRR-related issues, information exchanges, training,
developing methodology, technical assistance, networking and as a
direct service provider. There may be special requirements for
inter-governmental organisations to participate in a JRR mechanism;
for example, UNDP would need authorisation from the General Assembly
to incorporate the JRR within its mandate.
Participants discussed
potential problems that could arise in relation to the selection of
NGOs, in particular the independence of some NGOs and the extent to
which they may have links with local governments. It was noted that
this would be an issue that would have to be considered on a
case-by-case basis, which also underscored the importance of
pre-deployment briefing on the current situation in the country
concerned. It was agreed that both local and international NGOs
could play a useful role, with international NGOs bringing specific
expertise on specific issues and local NGOs bringing familiarity
with the situation and knowledge of local conditions. It was again
emphasised that it was likely that NGOs would support work
undertaken within a JRR framework so long as they can protect their
mandate and independence. Finally, it was noted that for many
funding bodies, it would be easier to provide funds to an NGO than
to a State for activities carried out within a JRR framework and it
may therefore be useful to identify an NGO that can do the
organisational work required to facilitate this process.
The main question on
which discussions centred during this session was how the JRR
mechanism can benefit States, the added-value it offers compared to
other initiatives and preliminary discussions on the possible next
steps. Participants generally agreed that the main outcome of the
Conference should be a summary of a simple basic description of the
JRR mechanism and a list of tasks for the next possible steps, with
the minimum goal being creating e-groups to keep the discussion
going and identifying opportunities at which the JRR mechanism could
be discussed, such as at the September meeting of the Council of
Europe on international criminal justice issues or at the Security
Council.
The main issue discussed
was the scope of the JRR mechanism, building on earlier discussions
as to whether that scope should be limited or broader. After much
discussion on the potential scope and role of the JRR mechanism, it
was generally agreed that the following paragraph adequately
reflected the consensus reached during this Conference on this
issue:
“JRR is intended to be an
international cooperative mechanism for the supply of voluntary
assistance at the request of a State or international institution,
where the identification, collection and preservation of information
would assist at any stage a wide range of international and
transitional justice options. The specific functions most likely to
be carried out by the JRR mechanism in this respect are, inter alia:
pattern of violence investigation; forensic mapping; documentary
evidence investigation; visual image collection; identification of
potential witnesses; identification of massacre sites. JRR was
identified as providing an improvement on the status quo by being a
cooperative mechanism that does not need to be created anew each
time there is a request for assistance. In this way, it can
significantly reduce response times in providing assistance that is
both impartial and which meets international standards; it shares
the burden of assistance through coordination of the resources of
States, international organizations and civil society; and, as a
global effort, provides capacity-building by involving all States in
the mechanism, irrespective of resources.”
Participants agreed on
the need to identify focal points to continue to follow the issues
and determine how the JRR mechanism might deal with a number of
issues, including funding, identification of organisations with whom
the JRR mechanism might work, the legal framework, interaction with
local organisations, criteria for rosters, standards for training
and a code of conduct. In this respect, it was noted that the
formation of rosters and standards for training is of critical
importance, since without these, it will be difficult if not
impossible to respond to requests for assistance. Participants
agreed that they would each identify focal points to follow the
ongoing discussions on the JRR mechanism, with some focal points
already identified during the Conference, and designated certain
participants to take the lead as coordinators for the development of
specific issues identified during the Conference.
Participants also agreed
on the need for an informal coordination mechanism to take the
process forward, with many possible options being discussed. It was
agreed that hosting secretarial functions within the European Union,
for example, would encourage the incorrect perception that the JRR
mechanism is a European mechanism, a misperception often faced by
others working in the field, including the International Criminal
Court. Further, it was noted that while a UN agency may be able to
perform secretarial functions, it would take some time to do a
proper assessment and gain the relevant authorisation.
Participants generally
agreed an international non‑government organisation could perform
these functions and requested that No Peace Without Justice, the
co‑organiser of the Conference, do so on an interim basis. NPWJ
agreed to undertake this role, on the understanding it included the
tasks of compiling information on a website/database; technical
assistance; and following the instructions of coordinators. While
this would initially be done through circulating documents from the
Conference (including this report), it was noted that there is still
a need for a State to volunteer to take overall leadership of the
JRR mechanism, which remains an important step in the follow-up
process.
The Conference concluded
with the participants agreeing by consensus that the Chair’s
Conclusions (see annex I) reflected the discussion and agreements
reached during the Conference. At the conference, draft guidelines
for the future cooperation in the JRR Mechanism and draft basic
elements of the procedure for the deployment of experts in the
framework of a JRR mission were distributed but not discussed.
(Annex 3).
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